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I. INTRODUCTION
After a series of strikes in the early 1980s, the independent trade
union, Solidarity,' forced the Polish government to begin liberaliz-
ing the economy.2 Once it became clear that the Soviet Union would
not intervene militarily,3 Poland not only began "moving from a central-
ly planned economy to a market-driven one, but also from socialism to
democratic capitalism."4 In June of 1989, free elections were held,
Communist rule was rejected, and Poland became "the first non-Com-
munist government in Eastern Europe since 1948."' On December 9,
' An independent, self-governed trade union which initially was "an all-pervasive demand
for greater personal liberty, independence and nationalism." Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling
Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 935, 961 (1982). Solidarity's activities
were suspended when Poland instituted martial law on December 13, 1981, and the union was,
as were all other unions, dissolved when the 1982 Act on Trade Unions was implemented.
David Storey, Poland Night Lead Solidarity, Reuters North European Service, Oct. 8, 1982, avai-
lable in LEXIS. Nexis Library, Reuters North European File. Many former Solidarity members
and adherents pursued their activities through underground illegal organizations. Waclaw Szubert,
New Trends in Polish Labour Relations, 12 COMP. LAB. L. . 62, 65 (1990). It was not until
1989, when the restrictive rules regarding the registration of trade unions were abolished, that
Solidarity was allowed to legally resume its activities. Id. Today, Solidarity still enjoys great
popularity while it continues to take on the role of a political party. Doing Business in Poland,
§§ 1.2.1-1.2.2, Dec. 20. 1991, available in, WESTLAW, Eurupdate File. In March of 1991, the
conservative members of Solidarity progressed to form a democratic party called the Centre Al-
liance, the largest single political party to spring from the break-up of Solidarity as a political
movement, and which now has the backing of Lech Walesa. Id.
2 Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1.
Trade Relations EC - Central and Eastern Europe, § 1.6, Dec. 20, 1991, available in,
WESTLAW, Eurupdate File.
' Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 1.21.
Contrary to the free market economy concept, the socialist economy is of
planned character. Not only is all production and distribution of raw materi-
als according to the economic plan, but the exchange of goods between
units of the socialised economy is subordinate to the plan. State-owned in-
dustry is directly influenced by the planning system, and in the so-called
private sector the indirect results of central planning are present.
J. Okolski, Current Development in Polish Economic Law, in ANGLo-PoLIsH LEGAL ESSAYS 117,
124 (X,.E. Butler ed., 1982).
' Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 1.1.
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1990, Lech Walesa6 became the first democratically elected president of
Poland and he has continued a stringent economic austerity program
designed to insure Poland's economic prosperity.7
Free labor unions are an essential part of stable democracies and
collective bargaining8 is one of the most fundamental principles of a
market economy.' "[A]ny successful economic policy must comport
with the natural ambition for material gain reasonably equivalent to an
6 Lech Walesa is now President of the Solidarity-led Polish national government, and won
the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in forming and leading Solidarity, the first independent
trade union established in a Communist country. The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: Walesa's
Nobel Peace Prize (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 5, 1983). Walesa was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize for his efforts to secure the workers' right to establish their own organization with-
out resorting to violence, since freedom of association is recognized as a fundamental human
right by the United Nations. Id. Walesa was credited as having a personal, charismatic style of
leadership with a brilliant common touch and political instincts that allowed him to think several
steps ahead of everyone else. Tom Matthews, et al., Decade of Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30,
1991, at 32.
' Realizing that a market economy based upon private ownership has proven world-wide to
be the only solution for the development of nations, Poland instituted a policy of radical eco-
nomic reforms to de-monopolize, dismantle and privatize Communist structures. Economic Re-
forms - Problems and Concerns, SOLIDARNOSC NEWS (Coordinating Office Abroad of the NSZZ
Solidamosc, Brussels, Belg.), Nov. 1990, at 1. To put an effective muzzle on inflation, the re-
form program involves a restrictive tax on wage increases, along with a major price de-control.
Id. Although the economic reform program keeps inflation relatively in check, it has lowered
living standards by thirty percent and drastically limited internal consumption. Id. On January 29,
1991, shortly after Lech Walesa was elected President, the government indicated "that the gross
domestic product had fallen twelve percent from the previous year and industrial productivity had
declined twenty-three percent. More than eight percent of the population were unemployed."
Gisbert H. Flanz, Chronology, in XIV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 4
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991).
The general nature of the process of collective bargaining has been succinctly summarized:
Collective bargaining is galvanized by the dual forces of economic power
and rationality. Typically, rational discussion initiates, directs, and consum-
mates this process of bilaterally determining wages, hours, terms and condi-
tions of employment; but it is accented by non-discursive features such as
party posturing, personality conflicts, and unreasonable constituency demands.
Ultimately, it is the threat and actual use of economic weapons that impels
the parties - union and management - toward contractual settlement. Since
the exercise of economic force can impose substantial costs on both parties
to a collective bargaining dispute, they are motivated to achieve settlement.
Calvin William Sharpe & Linda E. Tawill, Fact-Finding in Ohio: Advancing the Role of Ratio-
nality in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 283, 283 (1987). See also
Paul F. Gerhart & John E. Drotning, The Effectiveness of Public Sector Impasse Procedures: The
Six State Studies, in ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS, 146-47 (David B. Lipsky
ed., 1985); RIcHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERsIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS 400 (1965).
9 J. Brian Atwood, The Bush Agenda in Eastern Europe, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, July 6,
1989, at 18.
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individual's exertions and ingenuity in satisfying the private demands of
others."'" To continue the difficult transformation into a free market
economic system, Poland must give substance to its workers' fights to
freely associate, bargain collectively, and strike."
In 1991, Poland passed new labor laws as the result of its continu-
ing economic and political transformation. These laws will play an im-
portant part in determining whether Poland will become a member of
the European Community, whether Poland satisfies the United Nation's
International Labour Organization Conventions, and whether domestic
unions have been granted any new or expanded rights or powers. It is
the purpose of this Note to analyze whether or not Poland's 1991 labor
legislation is sufficient to meet these concerns. Part II will review the
history of labor relations in Poland and the main demands initially made
by Polish workers regarding the powers and role of labor unions. Part
III will highlight the important features of Poland's 1982 Act on Trade
Unions and subsequent criticisms. Part IV will compare and contrast
Poland's 1991 labor statutes with the 1982 Act. Parts V and VI will
respectively appraise whether the new labor code complies with EC and
ILO guidelines regarding worker rights.
II. HISTORY OF POLISH LABOR RELATIONS AND SOLIDARITY'S
DEMANDS REGARDING UNION RIGHTS
As a socialist government, Poland's labor laws were historically
based on the premise that labor relations should be regulated almost
exclusively by the state and based upon the notion of cooperation.'2
The government's "prevailing interest in settling economic labor disputes
[was] to maintain social peace at any expense."' 3
The Communist party and unions in eastern European countries
were inextricably linked under Communist regimes. David Buchan notes
that, "[tihe classic eastern block union [was] controlled by the [Commu-
nist] party." 4 Its president was usually a member of the "central com-
mittee and sometimes of the party politburo."'5 Although eastern block
unions did not bargain collectively'6 on their pay rates, their leaders
,0 Bruce Fein, Marshall Plan SEED, WASH. TimEs, Dec. 12, 1989, at Fl, F4.
" See U.S. Labor Technical Assistance for Poland, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 177, at E-1
(Sept. 14, 1989).
12 Andrze Swiatkowski, Current Developments in Labor Law and Labor Relations in Poland,
12 COMP. LAB. LJ. 35, 37-38 (1990).
'I Id. at 41.
14 David Buchan, The Real Essence of Solidarity, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1982, at 17, 18.
Id j.
26 "Collective bargaining, with its unpredictable results, would be an anathema . . . to the
theoretical orderliness of central planning." Id.
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had some input regarding wages. 7
Generally, however, Communist-controlled unions were "denied the
ultimate weapon of withdrawing their labour" because they could not
strike." "The structure of the trade union movement was imposed from
above" and was highly centralized; all unions "were subordinate to the
directives and control of the respective party agencies."' 9 Ultimately,
such centralization of power in state agencies and the Communist party
stifled the growth of independent labor organizations since they had no
opportunity to independently defend workers' interests." Nevertheless,
labor unions were subject to the directives and control of party agen-
cies," and due to the government's highly interventionist role in labor
relations, these agencies also took part in "collective negotiations"'
over limited aspects of working conditions.'
Frequently conflicts, such as spontaneous strikes, between the work-
ers and the central state authorities were responsible for shaping the
terms and conditions contained in collective bargaining agreements.24
Therefore "every serious labor dispute and conflict necessarily involved
the government and assumed a political character."' s
The organizational structure of the trade unions ... was based on.
democratic centralism ... [and resulted in trade unions that], as the
independence of the lower levels of the trade union organization was
limited .... acquired features of bureaucratic centralism. The bureau-
cratic fossilization of the trade unions .... [and] the fact that they
gave priority to functioning as co-organizers of the production process
7 Id.
" Id. "Strikes by workers against the workers' state are seen as, at best, illogical." Id.
" Szubert, supra note 1, at 62-63.
o Id. at 62.
21 Id. at 63.
2 Collective negotiations involved negotiations between trade unions and economic admin-
istrative organs, resulting in "collective agreements" covering wages, benefits, working conditions,
health and safety, social, welfare, and cultural conditions, and each party's obligations under the
agreement involving the rules and means of its implementation. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ch. XIII, § 1 (1988) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Collective agreements had to conform to Polish laws and its social and econom-
ic policies. Id. "Branch collective agreements" could be negotiated and concluded by national
union federations and national employer federations for certain occupations or industries and
would be the minimum required to be included in plant or "work place" collective agreements.
Id. These agreements had to be registered with the Minister of Labor and Social Policy before
becoming effective, and were declined registration if they did not conform to the Polish law
and/or social and economic policies. Id.
' Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 37.
24 Id. at 63-64.
2 Id.
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over their function as defenders of workers' rights and interests, were
the main. . . criticism[s] raised against the trade unions in Poland in
1980.26
In August of 1980, the working class engaged in mass protests
"against the policies of the government and the methods of running the
national economy," sparking a turning point in the development of Pol-
ish labor relations.27 The Poles valiantly struggled for the fundamental
human rights of forming self-governing trade unions and the right to
strike.2' As a result, a Social Agreement was negotiated in that same
month which provided for the establishment of independent and self-
governing trade unions.29
The new unions "attracted the vast majority of work[ing] people 30
and sought to become their authentic representatives by defending
employees' rights and interests and seeking full freedom of the founda-
tion and activities of the trade unions.3 An independent trade union
movement emerged and manifested a militant attitude by backing its
demands with economic pressure.32 Without violence and with a disci-
plined flexing of muscle, workers engaged in massive strikes to protest
government mismanagement.33 The strikes transformed themselves into
a genuine insurgent workers' movement when the workers realized that
' INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1. The role of the unions inclu-
ded responsibility for "promoting the development of production through constructive cooperation
with management:' Id. See also Szubert, supra note 1, at 63.
" Szubert, supra note 1. at 64.
Is The Spirit of Poland, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Sept. 2, 1980, at 24. Former U.S. Presid-
ent Ronald Reagan has written that free men have the right "to refuse to work for just grievan-
ces: the strike is an unalienable weapon of any citizen." RONALD REAGAN & R. HUBLER, WHER-
E'S THE REST OF ME? 138 (1965).
" INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1. In response to the "Baltic
coast strike that rocked Poland's economy," the government agreed to enter into this agreement
with the trade unions. John Damton, Can Poland Live With Its Bargain?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31,
1980, § 4. at 1. The agreement "recognised the workers' right to establish new trade unions as
an 'authentic representation of the working class"' and acknowledged a union's right to strike.
L. Garlicki, Polish Constitutional Development in 1980, in ANGLO-POLISH LEGAL ESSAYS, supra
note 4, at 155, 162. The new unions were prohibited from acting as political parties; "their ac-
tivities [had] to be oriented toward a representation of social and financial rights of the workers."
l Under this agreement, new unions had to apply for registration in the Warsaw District Court;
fifty unions were registered in that court between September and December of 1980. Id. at 162-
63 n.18.
3 Szubert, supra note 1, at 64.
"' Sylwester Zawadzki, Inaugural Meeting of Trade Union Bill Drafting Team (BBC radio
broadcast, Oct. 25, 1982).
32 Id.
3 Darnton, supra note 29, § 4, at 1.
576 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL [Vol. 25:571
they had a commonality of interest and wielded political power.'
The rise of these unions, recognized in Autumn, 1980, and regis-
tered with the Warsaw District Court as a national federation called
Solidarity, caused a complete breakdown of the previously imposed trade
union structure." The Solidarity movement was not limited to industrial
employees or farmers, but included intellectuals, professors, "lawyers andjudges, the Catholic Church, the Polish Writers' Union, Administration
of Justice employees, environmentalists, and certain leaders of the Com-
munist party."36
Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa, was "an all-pervasive demand for
greater personal liberty, independence and nationalism" rather than a
movement to "overthrow the Communist Party."37 Solidarity, employing
articles 82 and 83 of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic,38
34 id.
3 Id. National federations are national trade union bodies for a given branch of activity or
occupation. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 3. As a result of the So-
cial Agreement the following types of independent and self-governing trade unions were estab-
lished by the end, of 1980:
1. the social-occupational movement Solidarity, consisting of, according to its
own figures, about nine million members.
2. autonomous trade unions, consisting of about one million members.
3. the old branch trade unions, continuing their activity in a new guise, con-
sisting of, according to their own estimates, about five million members.
Id. ch. XII, § 1.
' Aldisert, supra note 1, at 961.
37 Id.
3' POL. CONST. OF 1952 (amended 1978), ch. 8, arts. 82-83. Article 82 states:
1. The Polish People's Republic shall guarantee freedom of conscience and
religion to its citizens. The Church and other religious societies and organi-
zations shall freely exercise their religious functions. Citizens shall not be
prevented from taking part in religious activities and rites. No one may be
compelled to participate in religious activities or rites.
2. The Church shall be separated from the State. The principles of the rela-
tionship between Church and State, and the legal and patrimonial position of
religious communities shall be defined by law.
Id. art. 82. Article 83 continues:
1. The Polish People's Republic shall guarantee its citizens freedom of
speech, of the press, of meetings and assemblies, of processions and demon-
strations.
2. To put these freedoms into effect, the working people and their organiza-
tions shall be given the use of printing shops, stocks of paper, public build-
ings and halls, means of communication, the radio, and other necessary ma-
terial means.
Id. art. 83. At the present time, parliamentary and senate committees are drafting a new consti-
tution "to codify legal and institutional changes and symbolize Poland's peaceful revolution from
a one-party state to a democracy." CoMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
102ND CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, 1233
1993] POLAND'S 1991 LABOR STATUTES 577
which insures freedom of conscience and speech, fashioned a broad
class-based political program to confront totalitarianism and initiate so-
cial reforms.3 9
Solidarity was a movement that found expression in varied forms -
from the demands of the ship builders in Gdansk, to the cries at a
national bar meeting at Poznan for a more vigorous representation by
lawyers to ferret out abuses by public prosecutors and prison wardens,
to a successful protest by environmentalists in Krakow to close down a
government operated forge that was polluting the skies over the city
with deadly fumes.4
When refused a genuine dialogue, the unions' tactics included strikes,
demonstrations, slow-downs, sit-ins, and the forcing of hasty conces-
sions.4
"[T]he anomalies of independent trade unions existing in a Commu-
nist country" soon became painfully apparent for Poland.42 In a Com-
munist state, where "the government is the employer of all[,] ...unio-
n[s] become the defender[s] of all."43 Unions became "automatically
national in scope, in membership and in spirit . . . [therefore] a loca-
lized dispute [could] turn into a national crisis, with the union leadership
threatening ... strikes to exert leverage."'  From the workers' point of
view, "[t]he limits on [their] demands [were] not what [was] economic-
ally feasible but what [was] politically obtainable." 45
"While the unions [could] threaten strikes, the Government's arsenal
[was] limited."'  To get production back on the rails, the government
initially offered the unions joint responsibility in managing enterprises,
which the unions summarily rejected; they only wanted "to represent
workers' interests and not become a part of the system."'47 As the gov-
(Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter CoUNTRY REPORTS].
" Aldisert, supra note 1, at 961.
40id
"' Program Resolution of the lind Congress of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union
Solidarnosc, SoLIDARNosc NEws (Coord. Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarnosc, Brussels, Beig.)
April 1990, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Program Resolution].
42 John Darnton, Polish Puzzle: (Free) Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1980, at A12.
43 Id.
4 Id.
' Id. In the West, the demands of the unions are tempered by law, by accepted procedures
for collective bargaining, and by the economic realities of free enterprise. Workers cannot de-
mand too much or the employer will go bankrupt .... In a Communist state, where the go-
vernment is the employer, these constraints do not apply [and] [t]he result is chaos ....
Id
z Id.
4 Id.
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emiment learned from the demands presented by Lech Walesa, Polish
workers acting exclusively through labor unions of their own choosing,
primarily wanted to be the guardians and protectors of their legal, eco-
nomic, social, and professional rights and interests." In the early
1980s, the Polish workers' and Solidarity's main demands regarding
unionism included:
1. The right to form independent trade unions - to set up self-gov-
erning trade unions independent from administrative bodies to freely
allow them to determine the objectives and goals of their con-
stituents, 9 to express the workers' opinions, and protect and defend
their social and material interests.
2. The right to collectively bargain - to engage in productivity-
based collective bargaining through direct labor management negotia-
tions.5"
3. The right to strike - to use the ultimate union economic weapon
to achieve collective bargaining demands."
4. Revision of the censorship laws - provision of real opportunities
for the new trade unions to publicly state goals and objectives, views
on key issues, and comments on the government's key decisions, in-
cluding securing radio and television time, as well as the right to issue
publications."
5. The democratic election of union authorities.53
6. The right to have a voice in the decision-making process.'
7. The right of farmers to form an independent union having a right
to strike.
8. The right of unions to own property.56
Solidarity suffered an initial setback in February 1981, when the Polish
Supreme Court rejected an appeal by private farmers to join an indepen-
' Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 42-43.
4' Gdansk Negotiations on 30th August (BBC radio broadcast, Sept. 1. 1980). See also The
Road from Gdansk, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 1980, at 15; The New Trade Union Law: Applications
for Registration (BBC radio broadcast, Aug. 25, 1982).
5 Eric Bourne, Poland Tries Way to Have its Meat and Eat It, Too, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, July 14, 1980, at 7.
5 The Road From Gdansk, supra note 49.
52 Id. See also Rob Strybel, International News. Warsaw-Labor, 1981 Reuters Ltd.. March 5.
1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News File.
53 Zawadzki, supra note 31.
5 Id.
" Thomas A. Sancton, A General Takes Charge; The New Premier May be Kania's Last
Chance to Restore Order Peaceably, TIME, Feb. 23, 1981, at 24, 25.
m John Darnton, Polish Court Denies Appeal by Farmers for a Trade Union, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1981, at Al.
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dent trade union.57 Although the court recognized that the "farmers had
rights under international law to unionize, [it held that they had] no
such right under Polish law because they were self-employed, [therefore]
not employees."58 Instead, the court said that the farmers' organization
could register as an "association" without collective bargaining rights.59
In the same month, Poland's new Premier, General Wojciech
Jaruzelski, imposed a moratorium on strikes and sit-ins, along with a
plea for three months of uninterrupted work to allow the government to
sit down with Solidarity to examine labor reforms." The Polish Pre-
mier wanted to minimize destructive activities which could lead to con-
flict, and to appease the Soviet government which had recently charged
the "counter-revolutionary forces" in Poland with launching a "frontal
attack" on the Communist party.6
Successive crises in Poland ensued, and Poland's labor movement
took on international significance as the economic and geopolitical con-
sequences were felt.62 The Solidarity movement was "marked by great
social tensions and ... growing instability in the country."'63 The
growing political and economic crises in Poland caused the Polish gov-
ernment to declare a state of emergency and impose martial law on
December 13, 1981 to suspend the activities of all trade unions."
In 1982, Solidarity and all other existing union organizations were dis-
solved by Poland's 1982 Act,' which also established strict conditions
for the formation of new labor organizations. 6
The primary role of unions at that time was transmitting these di-
rectives to their members and handling workers' grievances.67 Follow-
ing the 1982 Act, trade unions were defined as autonomous and inde-
7 Id.
53 Id.
5 Id.
' Sancton, supra note 55, at 24.
61 Id.
6 Jerzy Milewski, et al., Poland: Four Years After, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 337, 337-38 (1986).
' Szubert, supra note 1, at 65.
64 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1. Despite the imposition of
martial law, Solidarity members campaigned to keep the union alive. However, more than 800
union activists, including the Solidarity chief Lech Walesa, were interned without trial as a res-
ult. Storey, supra note 1.
' Zmieniajac Ustawe 0 Wykonywaniv I Organizaci, Rzemiosia [1982 Act on Trade Unions,
as amended], ch. V (Po0.) (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Act]. Article 59 stated that "[tihe registrations
of trade union[s] performed prior to the enactment of this Law lose their legal validity." Id.
' Id. ch. H. See also David Storey, Warsaw, Poland, 1982 Reuters Ltd., Oct. 8, 1982,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International News File.
'6 1982 Act, supra note 65, ch. H.
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pendent of the state and enterprises where their members work.' Un-
ions were given authority to represent and protect employees' rights and
interests regarding working conditions, wages, and social and cultural
facilities.69 Trade unions were authorized to independently determine
their objectives and programs 0 as long as they were within the union's
self-determined internal rules and regulations, which had to be compat-
ible with Poland's constitution and other laws.7' Former Solidarity
members violently contested the legitimacy of the process which allowed
the creation of these new unions under the 1982 Act.72 Rather than
disband as required under the 1982 Act, the Solidarity movement went
underground to pursue their activities through illegal organizations." Its
members, as well as thousands of others, protested and boycotted the
official institutions.74 Solidarity remained faithful to its fundamental
values; it maintained a willingness to engage in discussions for the good
of the country and never engaged in violence.75 Solidarity "survived
due to its deep social roots, the support offered by western societies,
trade unions and governments, and .. .the Church."'76
In November 1984, the Communist regime set up OPZZ7 (the
All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions) to counter the influence of Soli-
darity. After it was established, it became Poland's largest national fed-
eration, a status which it has not given up today.78 The OPZZ was the
only legal alternative to Solidarity, and was affiliated with the Commu-
nist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.79 The OPZZ serves
the interests of its members in their industrial and social affairs, but
with a low political profile and low credibility when compared to Soli-
darity. 80
63 Id. art. 2.
61 Id. art. 6.
10 Id. art. 1.
7' Id. arts. I & 3.
n Szubert, supra note 1, at 65.
73 Id.
74 Program Resolution, supra note 41, at 1.
75 Id.
76 id.
" A national inter-union representative, which inherited the property of all trade unions dis-
solved in 1982, whose purpose was to defend the workers' rights and interests against admin-
istrative authorities. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, §§ 1. 3.
71 Id. See also Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 1.2.2.
7 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 38, at 1240.
Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 1.2.2.
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IT. POLAND'S 1982 AcT ON TRADE UNIONS
A. Significant Features of the Act
Poland's 1982 Act on Trade Unions (hereinafter 1982 Act)8' speci-
fied that: "trade unions are self-managing; 82 "membership in trade un-
ions is voluntary;"83 and "[tirade unions represent and protect the inter-
ests and rights of employees as regards working conditions, wages, so-
cial and cultural facilities"'  "in dealings with the management, state
and economic administration bodies, [and] social organizations .. . .
It stated that, "[t]rade unions are independent of state administration and
economic administration bodies" and "are not subject to supervisions or
control by the state administration bodies."86
Under this legislation, employees literally had the right to create
and associate in unions according to their needs and wishes. However,
to form a new labor organization, strict conditions had to be satisfied.
Persons desiring to form a trade union had to elect a founding commit-
tee and adopt internal rules and regulations relating to the union's activ-
ities, the organizational structure, and election of the union executive
boards, *and then register the union in court.88 A union needed a mini-
mum of ten members, or if another union was already operating within
the same enterprise, thirty members, and acquired legal status on the
date of registration.89 The 1982 Act allowed the creation of indepen-
dent, self-governing trade unions by guaranteeing the right of indepen-
dent determination of aims and programs of activity, internal by-laws,
organizational structures, and the principles regarding the selection of
boards and other leading bodies." The trade unions' independence from
administrative bodies was to be accomplished by fully excluding them
from state inspection and control, and by obliging state agencies to re-
frain from any action aimed at restricting a trade union's independ-
ence.9'
Although the 1982 Act expressly stipulated a union's independence
8 1982 Act, supra note 65.
' Id art. 1.2.
Id. art. 4.1.
u Id. art. 6.
'4 Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 2.2.
Storey, supra note 66.
1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 1, 18.
'9 Id. arts. 18, 20.
'o Id. arts. 18, 19, 21. See also The New Trade Union Law: Applications for Registration,
supra note 49.
"4 The New Trade Union Law: Applications for Registration, supra note 49.
581
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from state administration, the way was open for the new unions to be
dominated by the Communist party.92 In addition, the independence of
the trade union movement was further impeded since the 1982 Act re-
stricted the freedom of association by allowing only one trade union at
each enterprise." Beginning in January 1985, these unions were al-
lowed to form national structures and inter-union organizations.' It was
not until the 1982 Act on Trade Unions was amended on April 7,
1989"5 that employees were actually given the right to create and asso-
ciate in truly autonomous, independent trade unions.
9 6
The 1982 Act indicated that the trade union "acquires legal person-
ality and the right to pursue its activities on the date of its registra-
tion. ' '9 7 Under the 1982 Act, collective bargaining was limited only to
certain aspects regarding "wages, types of work performed, and working
conditions."9' Thus, collective bargaining agreements, which were sub-
ject to central state authority approval, "were not the result of 'real
bargaining.' 99 Under this statute, unions had "the right to express their
opinion on the guidelines or drafts of legislative acts and decisions in-
volving the rights and interests of working people and their families, to
include the living conditions of retired people, both those old and dis-
abled."'" Under the 1982 Act, trade unions had "the right to conclude
collective agreements of nationwide range ... [for] . . . all employees
in a given trade, regardless of their trade union membership."'0 ' In ad-
dition, under the 1982 Act, "[w]ages and working conditions in trades
not covered by collective agreements [were] established in agreement
with the trade unions."'02
92 Storey, supra note 66.
9' Szubert, supra note 1, at 65.
9 Id.
91 0 Zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludouej [Amendment to the 1982 Act on
Trade Unions] (Pol.) (1987) [herinafter 1982 Amendment].
9 Swiatkowski, supra not 12, at 36.
1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 20.
9 Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 37.
' "Real bargaining" cannot occur in a Communist state where the means of production have
been nationalized, depriving the employer of a self-sufficient position; employers are influenced
by the central state authorities and bargaining which occurs is subject to their approval. Szubert,
supra note 1, at 63. Therefore, the employer's position is merely "a link in the apparatus of the
states' economic administration." Id. at 64. "Real collective bargaining" requires the existence of
two self-sufficient parties: an autonomous trade union and an autonomous employer. Id. at 69.
Such bargaining cannot occur until state enterprises are privatised and employers regain their own
identities, which were lost under the "former totalitarian model of labour relations." Id
10o 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 22.1.
101 Id. art. 24.
102 Id.
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Article 35 of the 1982 Act specified that:
The activities of trade union organisations at plants comprise, specif-
ically: 3
1. Taking a position on all individual problems of employe-
es, in accordance with provisions of the Labour Code.
2. Assuming a standpoint to the plant's mhanagement and
workers' self-management bodies on issues involving the rights
and welfare of the workers, in particular on the formulation of
the workplace wages system, internal work rules, bonus and
award schemes, work schedules, holiday schedules and questions
involving the social, welfare, and cultural needs of the working
staff.
3. Co-operation with the plant's management in improving
the qualifications of the workforce, introducing rationalisation
[sic] initiatives and innovations and improving human relations in
the plant.
4. Control the observance of provisions of the Labour
Code, particularly with respect to occupational safety and hygie-
ne; directing the activities of the social Labor Inspectorate, and
the co-operation with the State Labor Inspectorate in this field.
5. Performance of social control over the allocation of
apartments available to the work place for distribution.
6. Representing the welfare, social and cultural needs of
retired employees (on old-age and disability pensions).
Under the 1982 Act, the collective bargaining subjects included the utili-
zation and distribution of the social and housing fund, and remuneration
including the award of prizes and bonuses, working regulations,
worktime distribution, and vacation plans."
The 1982 Act stated that "[s]hould a collective dispute develop, the
relevant trade union bodies and administration bodies shall immediately
begin negotiations with a view to settling the dispute."' 5 Under the
1982 Act, the subject of a "collective dispute" was not defined, and
therefore it was arguable that political issues affecting the employer-em-
I d. art. 35.
'0' Id. art. 36.
' Id. art. 40. See also id. arts. 41, 44; Poland Night Lead Solidarity, supra note 1. If neg-
otiations failed to resolve a dispute, either party could demand that conciliatory proceedings be
instituted. 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 41. If conciliation failed to resolve the dispute, the par-
ties submitted the dispute to public arbitration under art. 42. and only if the union stated prior
to arbitration that it would not be bound by the arbitration settlement could the union strike. l
arts. 42-44.
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ployee relationship were proper subjects of a collective dispute, which
the local union could pursue."t°
If negotiations failed to resolve the dispute, "either party [could]
demand that conciliatory proceedings be instituted . . . " and "
conducted by a committee consisting of six members appointed in equal
proportions by both parties.""'° These conciliation proceedings were
optional and could be omitted; however, omission of this stage prevent-
ed the union from ultimately striking because the legal mechanisms for
settling the dispute were not considered to have been exhausted.' If
an agreement was reached through the conciliatory proceedings, it was
binding for both parties. 9
If conciliation failed within the prescribed time limits, the concilia-
tion committee would prepare reports on the positions of the parties and
their differences, and the dispute would lead to compulsory social arbi-
tration, a further pre-condition to strike." ' In addition, to preserve its
right to strike, the union had to state, prior to arbitration, that it would
not be bound by the arbitration settlement."' Without such a declara-
tion, the arbitration settlement was binding for both parties and strike
action was precluded."' Furthermore, a strike ballot, the approval of a
superior union agency, and a seven-day notice to the employer were
required before a strike could commence.". "In the case of a dispute
regarding the content of a collective bargaining agreement, a strike could
not be proclaimed before the agreement's proper termination (which
[was], as a rule, subject to three months notice."'" 4)
1 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 40.
107 Id. art. 41. Article 41 states:
1. Should negotiations fail to resolve a dispute, either party may dem-
and that conciliatory proceedings be instituted. Conciliatory proceedings are
conducted by a committee consisting of six members appointed in equal pro-
portions by both parties.
2. An agreement should be reached through conciliatory proceedings
within seven days in the case of a dispute involving a single plant (i.e.
factory dispute), and within ten days when the dispute extends beyond a
single plant (i.e. a multi-factory dispute).
3. The settlement is reached in the form of an agreement binding for
both parties. Should the parties fail to reach an agreement, the committee
will draw up a protocol of discrepancy, indicating the position taken by both
parties.
Il
Jos INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XIV, § 2.
09 1982 Act, supra note 65, ch. V, art. 41.
110 Id.
111 Id. art. 42.
112 Id.
113 Id. art. 45.
,14 Id. art. 45.5. See also Szubert, supra note 1, at 66. In addition to restrictions discussed in
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The 1982 Act defined a "strike" as "a voluntary, collective stopping
of work by employees undertaken in order to defend the economic and
social interests of the given group of employees.""3 5 Under the 1982
Act, a strike was a last resort and could only be proclaimed after ex-
hausting the negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration proceedings." 6
Thus, for a union to strike, it was necessary to undertake preliminary
measures as early as six months before the proposed strike'17 and it
was procedurally difficult to reach the point when it could be legally
employed."' Therefore, the most effective means of insuring a part-
nership position for trade unions - the possibility of calling a strike or
using other means of protest in the case of a dispute - was highly
restricted and wildcat strikes were banned."9 The 1982 Act on Trade
Unions states in relevant part:
Article 45
1. A strike is proclaimed by the plant's trade union body, follow-
ing an approval in a majority of vote by employees in a secret ballot,
and the endorsement of such a decision by a superior trade union lev-
el. Participation in the ballot is voluntary.
3. Participation in a strike is voluntary. No one may be forced to
join a strike or to refuse to participate in one. No attempts may be
made to obstruct the desire to undertake work if conditions permit to
continue it by persons who have not joined the strike, or who decided
to retum to work. C
the text, "there were also restrictions on the right to strike depending on the functions exercised
by the workers and the nature of services rendered by them." IdM The right to strike was not
vested in civil servants; bank employees; employees of courts and prosecutors' offices; military
units; establishments subject to ministers of defense and home affairs; workers of enterprises
producing, storing, or supplying food, water, electricity, and gas; health service employees; em-
ployees in the arms industry; and to some extent, employees in transportation and mass media.
1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 13-15. Cf. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII,
§ 3. In addition, the law banned strikes in enterprises located in regions which were proclaimed
"disaster areas." 1982 Act, supra note 65. art. 50. Article 50 banned strikes in plants located in
regions which have been proclaimed disaster areas - "from the moment of such proclamation."
il. Furthermore, political strikes were specifically forbidden. Id. art. 44.5. "Political strikes are
inadmissible." Id.
" 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 44.1.
"' Id. art. 44.2.
11 COUNTRY RPPORTS, supra note 38, at 1240.
uS INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XXIV, § 1.
"' 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 40-52. See also Zawadzki, supra note 31; Poland May
Offer Union Legality, Deal Would Require Solidarity Support for Party Reforms, CtI. TRIB., Jan.
14, 1989, at C8.
CASE W. RES. I INT'L L[
Article 51
Participation in a strike organised in accordance with the above provi-
sions does not constitute a violation of employees' duties and responsi-
bilities, and cannot involve adverse consequences for the participants.
This provision also applies to other forms of protest, referred to in
Article 36, Sect.2.
Article 54
Anyone who directs a strike organised contrary to the provisions
of this Law, is liable to the punishment of prison up to one year, to
limitation of freedom, or to pay a fine up to 50,000 zlotys.
Articles 51 and 52 of the 1982 Act state that "participation in a
strike organised in accordance with the above provisions does not con-
stitute a violation of the employees' duties and responsibilities, and can-
not involve adverse consequences for the participants." 20 During a le-
gal strike, "employees preserve the right to social security allowances
and other benefits due under the contract of employment, except the
right to pay.''
B. Criticisms of the 1982 Act
Poland's 1982 Act was criticized by scholars and commentators
because it restricted the scope and content of collective agreements. For
example, collective agreements covered only wages, the type of work
performed, and working conditions."' Under the 1982 Act, wages were
set in tripartite negotiations at the enterprise level between unions, man-
agement, and workers' councils.1
23
Collective bargaining was further restricted by Poland's two-tiered
bargaining system in which bargaining occurred at both industry and
plant levels.24 "Polish labor law does not recognize the exclusivity"z
and majority26  principles developed by American labor law.""1v
' 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 51, 52.
121 id. art. 52.
1,, Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 43.
m COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 38, at 1241.
'2' Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 37.
' Under section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, "[w]hen a union is designated by
the NLRB as the representative of a group of employees, or when an employer privately accords
the union such recognition, the union enjoys the exclusive right to represent those employees."
DOUGLAs L. LEsLiE, LABOR LAW 17 (West Nutshell Series 1986).
2 When a union wins a valid representation election, it is presumed to have the majority of
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Under Poland's two-tiered bargaining system, any agreement reached at
the plant level had to conform to the terms and conditions agreed upon
at the industry level." "Collective agreements" negotiated at the na-
tional or industry level covered all employees in a given trade and had
to be registered at a provincial court, but registration was refused if the
contract diverged from the social and economic policies of the state.'29
In addition, unions had to develop a common position for all mandatory
subjects of bargaining within thirty days.3 If the trade unions were
unable to reach a common position, the employer (government) inter-
vened and regulated wages and conditions of work on a uniform basis
in enterprises all over the country.' Because little flexibility existed,
little collective bargaining was possible or actually occurred.'
For collective bargaining to be a meaningful process, it was urged
that the state relinquish its active role in regulating wages and working
the employees' support for the following 12 months under section 9(c)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act. Ia at 25.
tn Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 38.
I l at 37. National trade union federations were authorized to reach "branch collective
agreements" with employers' organizations for a given branch of activity or occupation. INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1. If such an agreement had been negotiat-
ed, a "workplace collective agreement" at an individual plant covered under the branch collective
agreement could apply higher wages and benefit rates than the minimum layed down in the
branch collective agreement if the individual plant enterprise had sufficient financial resources. l
Particularly, the "workplace collective agreement" specifies:
1. the tasks connected with the implementation of plans of the enter-
prise or establishment regarding the creation of conditions favouring in-
creased labour productivity and improvement of operational efficiency and
strengthening of labour discipline.
2. the workplace remuneration system elaborating detailed conditions
regarding wages and other benefits connected with work.
3. on the basis of and within the framework of the branch collective
agreement, detailed rules regarding working conditions and other matters
connected with the implementation of the agreement.
Id.
' 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 26.6.
6. The Court will refuse to register a trade union should its statutes
indicate that the organisation in question is not a trade union as defined by
this Law, or if the provisions of the statutes are incompatible with the
Law's regulations.
lId
m Trade Union Act of April 7, 1989, art. 18, § 8.
t31 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1. "Ideological differences" be-
tween politically motivated national and local level labor organizations may impede the reaching
of a common interest, which might ultimately affect the bargaining process. Id
3 Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 37. Due to the current legal system and economic situa-
tions of many enterprises, plant level unions were forced to accept the framework negotiated by
the industry-wide unions. L
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conditions, and simply define mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing. 3 Admittedly, the decentralization of the regulation of wages
could result in the more influential workers receiving benefits at the
expense of others and contribute to the growing inflation rate and thus
increasing the cost of living and the inflation rate."34
Nevertheless, the government was urged to withdraw as an active
participant in labor relations and to recognize the relationship between
organized labor and employers, and instead, to merely facilitate a proce-
dure by which the parties could resolve their differences.'35 It was also
suggested that employers should attain an autonomous position from the
government to improve collective bargaining.136 However, the vast ma-
jority of employers are currently state-owned enterprises controlled by
the government and have not yet attained an autonomous position under
Poland's privatization program.'37
Under this view, privatization of industrial employers is necessary
before genuinely free collective bargaining can produce a labor contract
reflecting the economic positions of the parties in the new market econ-
omy. Finally, the notion that different labor unions existing at an
employer's plant should reach a common agreement before negotiating
with an employer frustrates the achievement of free collective bargain-
ing, and merely strengthens the state's role as the sole power in labor
relations.'
Under the 1982 Act, the statutory settlement procedures of negotia-
tion-mediation-arbitration, which had to be exhausted before a strike
could be called, were an attempt to persuade the parties to move to
reasonable solutions.'39 However, unlike strikes, that process did not
impose the unacceptable costs that the parties wished to avoid, and had
little persuasive effect over an employer who was unwilling to concede
during settlement negotiations."
As heirs to the traditional Communist-sponsored unions,"'
m Id. at 43.
134 Szubert, supra note 1, at 69.
131 Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 44.
"3 Szubert, supra note 1, at 69.
I As of August 31, 1991, less than 10 percent of Poland's 8,443 state enterprises had been
transformed into privately-owned corporations. Ada Kostrz-Kostecka, Minister Lewandowski's View
of the First Year of Privatization: Economics Overshadowed by Politics, POLISH NEWS BULL,
Oct. 8, 1991.
" Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 44.
139 Id.
"4 See WALTON & MCKERSM, supra note 8, at 30-33. The Polish system was similar to
some U.S. public sector collective bargaining statutory impasse procedures. Sharpe & Tawill,
supra note 8, at 285-86.
"' Traditionally, Communist-sponsored unions limited the workers' rights of association and
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Poland's new unions needed a virtually unrestricted right to strike to se-
cure the necessary strength in negotiating and administering collective
bargaining agreements. Without a genuine right to strike, the nature of
the union-management relationship is different from that typically en-
joyed in the United States private sector.'42 Unionized employees in
the U.S. private sector, for example, have the right to strike to exert
economic pressure on the employer to yield to their demands.'43 Only
with such a power can unions begin to fully address workers' concerns
regarding wages, benefits, and working conditions since the cost of a
strike can force management to negotiate with workers.
"In labor-management negotiations, the parties are usually held
together by a considerable area of joint dependency."'" Typically, both
parties derive benefits from being in the relationship and experience
important sacrifices during a strike. 45 The parties can be motivated to
bargain to divide any "joint gains" by market-like forces or from legisla-
tion.' The possibility of a costly strike encourages a negotiator to
proceed with caution.47 As the strike costs increase, the parties have a
greater incentive to reach a mutually agreeable settlement.'48 If a union
is not able to impose strike costs upon a company, the latter has no
incentive to meet the union's demands but attempts to maximize its total
utility by increasing its size of the joint gains.'49 To avoid such a mo-
the independence of the lower levels of the trade union, and union activities were supervised by
state administrative authorities. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1. In
1980, a Social Agreement provided for self-governing trade unions which were independent from
state administration. Id. However, as a result of the imposition of martial law in December of
1981, the activities of all trade unions formed under the Social Agreement were suspended and
the unions were dissolved after the 1982 Act on Trade Unions was implemented. Id. Although
the 1982 Act literally allowed independent and self-governing unions, it was not until 1989,
when the restrictive rules regarding the registration of trade unions were abolished, that multi-
unionism became a reality. Id. See also Szubert, supra note 1, at 65. Under the 1991 Law, "a
trade union is a voluntary and self-governing organization. ... 0 Zwiazkach Zawodowych
[Law on Trade Unions], art. 1.1 (Pol.) [hereinafter 1991 Law].
14 See Sharpe & Tawill, supra note 8, at 285-86.
13 JuLIus G. GErMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELAIONS - THE BASIC PRO-
cEss, LAW AND PRACrICE 138 (1988). However, there are some limitations on the right to
strike during a contract. See infra note 245.
'" vALTER & MCKERSIE, supra note 8, at 400.
145 Id.
' Id. at 399-400.
"< Id. at 31. Strike costs for a union include: (1) lost wages; (2) loss of institutional securi-
ty; (3) loss of good will of management; and (4) loss of public image. Id Typical strike costs
incurred by management include: (1) loss of operating profits and/or market share; (2) loss of
negotiator status with higher management or stockholders; (3) loss of good will with labor, and
(4) loss of public image. Id.
~ Id at 31-35.
14 Id. at 13, 29, 31.
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nopolistic employer position, the employees' unions must be given an
effective right to strike.
However, until Polish employers gain an autonomous position from
the government through private ownership of enterprises, a union's pow-
ers may not be exploited fully since collective agreements require the
existence of two self-sufficient parties. 5 In a Communist state, where
the government runs the state enterprises, the terms of collective bar-
gaining agreements are ultimately subject to state authority approval, and
are subject to politics rather than economic feasibility. 15  As of August
31, 1991, only 8.8 percent of 8,443 state enterprises were transformed
into corporations owned by the state treasury as a single shareholder or
privatized by liquidation.' The Polish government therefore continues
to run the vast majority of businesses as state enterprises. This may
explain why Poland's 1991 labor law revisions continue to closely paral-
lel the Federal Labor Relations Act (hereinafter FLRA), 5 1 the U.S.
statute covering labor relations between the federal government and
unions, rather than the National Labor Relations Act,"s the U.S. statute
that governs private sector labor relations.
Since the government essentially runs Poland's industries, services,
and government offices, it plays a large role in determining the wages
and working conditions for employees in all industries. Such a situation
does not allow free interplay of the labor market economic forces, and
thus is counter to a market-driven economy. The unions basically repres-
ent the workers in front of government negotiators, becoming protectors
of all citizens' rights, similar to an elected government official, and may
continue to take on the role of a political party and misuse strikes as a
weapon to improve overall living standards. 55 The question then be-
,So Szubert, supra note 1, at 69.
' See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
1 Kostrz-Kostecka, supra note 137. "Privatization" involves transforming state enterprises into
independent, self-governing, and self-financing economic entities with their own legal status, such
as joint-stock or limited-liability companies which will be owned by private sector investors.
Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 2.1.1. Prior to the privatization program,
[a]ll natural resources [were] state-owned in Poland, as [was] 44 percent of
the total land area, 80 percent of the means of production (industrial plants)
and 55 percent of non-productive property (residential buildings, schools, hos-
pitals, etc.). About 2 percent of the land, 6 percent of the means of produc-
tion, and 10 percent of non-productive property (cooperative apartments)
[were] the property of cooperatives. Thus, the socialised economy [had] at
its disposal all natural resources, about 50 percent of the land (i.e. about 12
million hectares, including more than 65 percent of woodland), 86 percent of
the means of production, and 65 percent of non-productive property.
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. I, § 4.
,s3 See generally, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (1988).
' See generally, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988).
,s Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1. § 1.2.2. See also id. § 4.4.7.1. Solidarity was
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comes whether the government's response will be to continue its policy
of settling economic labor disputes to maintain social peace at any
cost. 56
The 1991 labor regulations were hoped to guarantee and further
extend a union's freedom to bargain over more than just wages and
working conditions, and to promote the notions of industrial justice,
basic fairness, and legality.'57 Andrzej Swiatkowski stated that "justice
and fairness in labor relations can be served only by maintaining the
proper balance of rights and duties between the parties . . . ."1 The
new labor code was suggested to be extended to cover all employees
and regulate the minimum rights and maximum duties of employees and
employers.1
59
formed in the summer and fall of 1980 on a wave of illegal worker strikes which produced the
initial social accords, and subsequently "became the bulwark of democratic opposition." Program
Resolution, supra note 41, at 1. "Its strength derived from a rebellion against exploitation and
abuse of human labour, against disrespect for human rights, social oppression and contempt for
national traditions." Id.
The situation in Poland is distinguishable from the American public sector unions which do
not have a right to strike. The American labor market "imposes substantial limits on the ability
of public employers to take advantage of their employees." HARRY H. WELItNGTON & RALPH K.
WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 168 (The Brookings Inst. 1971). American public
employers must compete for workers with private employers, and therefore cannot permit their
wages and conditions of employment to be relatively poorer than those offered in the private
sectors and still get the needed workers. L By contrast, in Poland, the government has a predo-
minant role in determining the wages in the public and private sector, and therefore, the public
employers have no private sector employers free from government domination which provide a
relative benchmark for wages and benefits. Furthermore, in America, public employee unions
serve as lobbying agents wielding political power "quite disproportionate to the size of their
membership." Id. at 169. With such power, the American public sector unions are able to engage
in effective collective bargaining despite the absence of a right to strike. As evidenced by the
Polish labor movement's strategy from its inception, it wields political power against the govern-
ment, similar to the American public sector unions, since they have felt that they have not yet
been granted an effective right to strike.
'" Traditionally, Poland's prevailing interest was to settle economic labor disputes and "mai-
ntain social peace at any expense." Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 41. For example, in response
to Solidarity's illegal strikes in 1980, the government reached a Social Agreement rather than
punishing the strikers. See discussion supra note 141. As a further example, in response to the
workers' strikes in the spring and summer of 1988, the Polish government was again forced to
accept and legally recognize Solidarity as a representative force in Polish society. Program Resol-
ution, supra note 41, at 1. See also discussion supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
" Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 46.
I S u
u9 Id. at 45.
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C. Worker Dissatisfaction With the 1982 Act
The declaration of martial law, followed by the passage of the 1982
Act, temporarily ended Poland's economic liberalization."W It was not
until 1988 that reforms once again began to be developed."' The gov-
ernment offered no solutions to the Polish problems and internal and
domestic isolation resulted, so Solidarity continued to gain moral and
political authority. The crisis and political transformations occurring
in the Soviet Union opened a way out of the impasse. In October of
1987, "[Solidarity] resume[d] overt activity. Worker strikes in spring and
summer of 1988 marked the turning point. The authorities were forced
to accept Solidarnosc as the representative force of the Polish society,
and this . . . [led to] the relegalization of the union . ... ""
In the late 1980s, however, industrial conflicts and work stoppages
became more and more frequent. In addition, all were initiated beyond
the official unions' control. Workers disregarded the procedures provided
by legal provisions, deeming them too cumbersome to be observed,
especially in the case of serious conflicts. Wildcat strikes also continued
after the recognition of the Solidarity unions in 1988; despite their legal
character, sanctions were not inflicted on the strikers because the general
political climate of the country did not permit the rigid application of
the law."
During some of the 1988 strikes, trade unions voiced their displea-
sure with the legal procedures regarding the right to strike, claiming that
the process was too long and complicated and workers may be inclined
to disregard it and engage in illegal strikes. 65 The U.S. Department of
State concluded that because of those restrictions, it was virtually impos-
sible to conduct a legal strike in Poland."6 Indeed, in the late 1980s,
workers disregarded those procedures and engaged in wildcat strikes
without any sanctions being imposed against them for their illegal ac-
tions.67
The current Solidarity Chairman, Marian Krzaklewski, once stated
that, "the most important thing is to have a law that will not protract
disputes, in terms of time and procedural aspects alike."'" In late
" Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 1.1.
161 Id.
" Program Resolution, supra note 41, at 1.
16 Id.
'" Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 67-68.
16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 3.
,61 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 38, at 1240.
"6 Szubert, supra note 1, at 68.
"' Jagienka Wilczak, Time to Address Everyday Tasks: Interview With Solidarity Marian
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1989, Leslaw Newacki, Director General of the Polish Milnistry of Labor
and Social Affairs, stated that, "unions are exploiting the negotiation and
conciliation procedure by striking right away."'" Therefore, Waclaw
Szubert recommended that the new labor code re-define "lawful indus-
trial actions and simplify obligatory procedures." 70
Furthermore, since "Poland is a member of the international labor
community," a Polish scholar recommended that Poland voluntarily ac-
cept and comply with ILO standards and requirements."' If Poland
would do this, then "those standards would be more important than
other labor laws because they would represent the law of Poland and
the law of the international labor community.'
Thus, the substantive provisions of the 1982 Act, as well as various
commentators' recommendations to improve Poland's laws regulating
labor-management relations, provide a good backdrop for comparison of
Poland's 1991 Law on Trade Unions and Law on Resolving Collective
Bargaining Disputes with the 1982 Act. This comparison demonstrates
that not enough progress has been achieved. The 1991 legislation mainly
refines and clarifies the 1982 Act, continuing to track the FLRA rather
than the NLRA, however, making some minor improvements in the
1982 Act's substantive provisions. 7 ' The net effect seems to be an
elimination of one step in the legal procedure regarding the right to
strike74 and allowing collective bargaining agreements to diverge from
state, social, and economic parties. 75
Krzaklewski, POLISH NEws BuLL., April 12, 1991.
- Poland's Plans to Convert to Market Economy Include Jobless Aid, Training, Minimum
Wage Change, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208. at C-1 (Oct. 30, 1989).
' Szubert, supra note 1, at 68.
1 Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 47.
I Id.
m For example, the new legislation contains an anti-discrimination provision which states that
"[n]o one may suffer negative consequences for belonging or not belonging to a trade union or
for holding a trade union office. In particular, membership or non-membership may not be a
requirement for hiring, retaining or promoting an employee." 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 3.
This anti-discrimination provision ensures that union membership is voluntary and closely tracks
the 1982 Act, which provided that:
No person shall suffer negative consequences either because of his/her mem-
bership in a trade union and performing within it functions of an elected
official; or because of his/her non-membership; specifically, this cannot be a
condition for obtaining or keeping employment, or of professional promotion,
apart from cases where the provisions of this law ban trade union member-
ship in a specific work place or specific job.
1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 4. Other examples of re-codification include: 1991 Law, arts. 4, 10
and 1982 Act, arts. 1.2, 6.
" See infra notes 229-32 and related text.
'7S See infra notes 304-5 and accompanying text.
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IV. POLAND'S 1991 LABOR LAWS COMPARED WITH THE 1982 ACr
A. Introduction
"In the present social and political situation in Poland, the role of
the trade unions is very important." 76 Presently, "the major causes of
strike action are the threat of group dismissals and pressure to increase
salaries associated with the current financial situation."" Poland's eco-
nomic reform program resulted in an inflation rate of 900 percent
in 1989.171
In an effort to eliminate the dramatic inflation which occurred in
1989, the government imposed a "de facto wage ceiling" which penal-
izes enterprises that raise wages above government-determined levels. 79
In addition, the government implemented a price liberalization program,
and together these two programs reduced inflation to between four and
five percent a month in 1990.18 However, the real standard of living
fell by approximately thirty percent.' At the end of 1990, "[forty-four
percent] of working households and [fifty-one percent] of pensionable
households were living below the official poverty level" according to
official statistics."
By May of 1991, unemployment had grown from a negligible num-
ber to approximately 1.5 million people. The Poles' situation is fur-
ther exacerbated by the fact that "consumer prices rose by an estimated
70 [percent] during the first three quarters of 1991."' Consequently,
employers can easily find and employ qualified workers to replace dis-
sidents as there is a high number of unemployed, resulting in increased
competition for job openings.8 5 Not only does the government-imposed
wage ceiling restrict a union's ability to negotiate wages, it also limits
the development of efficient enterprises by prohibiting them from attrac-
ting superior workers by means of higher wages. 86 Due to the declin-
ing living conditions, as well as their inability to effectively negotiate
wages, unions were eager to see a new labor law that would allow un-
'76 Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 4.4.7.1.
'7 Id. § 4.4.7.2.
' COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 38, at 1234.
I79 d. at 1241. Such enterprises must pay a penalty tax equal to five times the value of the
wage increase above the government-determined level. Id.
" Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 1.2.2.
181 Id.
182 Id.
193 id.
19 Id.
5 Id. § 4.4.7.2.
I' COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 38, at 1241.
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ions the genuine ability to represent their members' interests regarding
wages.'
B. The 1991 Law on Trade Unions Compared to the 1982 Act
The 1991 Law on Trade Unions 8' (hereinafter 1991 Law) defines
a trade union as "a voluntary and self-governing organization of laboring
people established with the object of representing and protecting their
rights and occupational and social interests."'89 This article incorporates
various sections of the 1982 Act and clarifies exactly what a union is
and what purpose it serves by specifically defining a trade union. 9 '
The 1991 Law states that "[tihe trade union's statutory activities are
independent of employers, central and local government, and other orga-
nizations."'' It better defines which employees can join trade unions,
while the previous statute merely stated that, "[e]mployees shall have the
right to set up and associate in factory, national and other trade unions
at their discretion."'" Under the 1982 Act, soldiers in active service,
members of the police force, members of prison services, employees of
military units, and other units controlled by the Ministry of the Interior,
workers in the state administration and judiciary, and farmers93 were
excluded from the right to associate in trade unions." Under the
1991 Law, professional military personnel, soldiers in active military
service, and draftees who perform their basic military service in civil
defense may not establish or join trade unions. 95 Therefore, under the
new statute, members of the police force, members of prison services,
and government employees can now establish or join trade unions.
The 1991 Law specifies that, "the right to establish and join trade
unions belongs to all employees .... [including] . . . members of agri-
cultural producer cooperatives; ... [and contractors] if they are not
employers."'" However, it remains unclear whether "members .of agri-
culture producer cooperatives" include farmers. Therefore, whether farm-
ers will be allowed to establish and join trade unions or whether they
will continue to be prevented from unionizing because they are self-
'19 d.
"' 1991 Law, supra note 141.
I d. art. 1.1. A trade union was not specifically defined in the 1982 Act. 1982 Act, supra
note 65, arts. 1, 2.
" 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 1.2, 4.1, 5, 6.
.9, 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 1.2.
"9 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 1.
'n Id. arts. 13, 14. See also hINATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1.
"' INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 1.
' 1991 Law, supra note 141, arts. 40, 41.
' ld. art. 2.
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employed is still an unresolved issue.97 The new law also allows per-
sons performing "commissioned work," retirees, and unemployed indi-
viduals to join trade unions.'98
An employee who does not belong to a union may nevertheless
nominate a trade union to represent him in a grievance or disciplinary
hearing if that union has given him permission to do so, under both the
former and current laws.' But before a union can represent a non-
union employee regarding an individual grievance or disciplinary matter,
he must request, and the union must consent to, such representation.'
However, neither law distinguishes between a union and a non-union
employee, and thus the union has a general duty to represent all
employees' interests "in dealing with the management." '' The 1991
Law basically clarifies the union's duty by refining the language of the
1982 Act.
The current law ensures unions of self-government by providing
that "[t]rade union by-laws and resolutions freely define the organiza-
tional structures of trade unions" and that "property obligations may be
undertaken solely by the statutory bodies of the trade union structures
having legal entity status.' '2"" That new provision clarified a similar
article under the earlier statute, which allowed trade unions "to deter-
mine independently and lawfully; ... their statutes and other internal
rules and regulations pertaining to trade union activities ...."'
Although the 1991 Law has not fully addressed the scholars' criti-
cisms, it is apparent that the provisions of the 1991 Law, as well as the
1982 Act, as amended in 1989, satisfy the Polish workers' and
Solidarity's demands regarding the right to form truly independent, self-
governing trade unions to determine and express their constituents' goals
and to literally, but not actually, protect and defend the workers' social
and material interests.2 ' In addition, the 1991 Law allows union au-
thorities to be democratically elected if the trade union by-laws and
regulations so provide. 5 Furthermore, article IX, chapter 1 of the
1991 Law specifically allows unions to own property, a right not ex-
19 See supra notes 71-73 and corresponding text.
198 1991 Law, supra note 141, arts. 2.2-2.4.
19 Id. art. 7.2. See also Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 4.4.7.1. A similar provi-
sion appeared in the prior legislation. 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 5, 6, 29.
' 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 7.2. See also 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 5, 6, 29 for
a similar clause.
" 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 7.
2 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 9.
1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 1.2.
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 13(9).
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pressly granted under the previous statute, but which was allowed.'
This satisfies another demand made by the workers in the early 1980s.
Under both statutes, no prior state authorization is required to form
a trade union and the requirements to form a trade union are equiva-
lent."3 "A trade union is formed by virtue of a resolution passed by at
least ten persons having the right to establish trade unions, or if another
trade union is already operating in the same enterprise, thirty such per-
sons."
20
To apply for registration under the new law, a union must meet the
membership requirements above,210 and the ten persons who resolve to
form the union must pass its by-laws and elect a founding committee
numbering three to seven members.' The founding committee must
then establish statutes (by-laws). Unions are registered in court on the
basis of their statutes." The founding committee must register the un-
ion with the local voivodship (district) court within thirty days of its
formation.2"3 This provision of the 1991 Law recodified a parallel
statement in the 1982 Act that indicated that the trade union acquires
"It]he status of a legal entity on the day of the union's registration." 214
The new legislation is more restrictive than its predecessor in that it
only allows "[n]ational trade union confederations and the national trade
union federation representative of the employees at a majority of the
work places the right to be consulted on the assumptions and drafts of
the legislation and implementing regulations relating to the purposes of
trade unions.2
Thus, the 1991 Law restricts the right granted in 1982 by allowing
only national trade union confederations or the national trade union
federation representing the majority of the employees in the country the
OPZZ owned property consisting of membership dues, donations, legacies, and grants,
income from economic and other statutory activities, and the property of all trade unions dis-
solved in 1982. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XII, § 3.
' 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 1.1; 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 2.1.
3 Id.
2 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 12.1.
210 See supra notes 174-75 and related text.
211 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 12.2. See also Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, §
4.4.7.1.
211 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 14.1. See also Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1.
§ 4.4.7.1
23 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 14.
214 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 20.
2. 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 19.1. A "federation" is a nationwide organization establis-
hed by a number of trade unions on either occupational or industrial grounds or in one branch
of the economy. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, 'ch. XII, § 1. A "confederation"
is a national inter-trade union organization consisting of national trade unions and/or their federa-
tions. 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 11.2.
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right to be consulted on legislative drafts. Furthermore, this right only
extends to legislation relating to the purposes of trade unions, rather
than to legislative acts and decisions involving the rights and interests of
the working people and their families, retirees, and the disabled.
By not allowing the small local or plant trade union2 .6 a real op-
portunity to publicly state its views on key issues regarding legislation
affecting workers and retirees, and by only allowing large union con-
glomerates or a federation representing the majority of the employees in
the country an option to state its view on legislation regarding the "pur-
poses of trade unions," the 1991 Law appears to stifle the number of
voices heard in the decision-making process, and further frustrate
achievement of a demand"7 sought by the Polish workers and Solidari-
ty in the early 1980s.
The current law further provides that if the national trade union
confederation or the national trade union federation representing the
majority of the employees responds with a counter-proposal to the legis-
lative draft which is entirely or partially rejected, the confederation or
federation may voice its position at a government session involving the
legislative draft. 8 According to the 1991 Law, "[tirade unions have
the right to express publicly their opinion on the assumptions or draft
legislation" relating to the purposes of trade unions "through the mass
media, including radio and television."2 9 Therefore, the new law does
allow small local unions to utilize mass media and have a voice in the
decision-making process. But again, the local unions can only comment
on legislation relating to the purposes of trade unions.
National trade union confederations and the national trade union
federation representing the majority of the employees can "offer propos-
als for the passage or amendment of laws or other legal acts concerning
matters of concern to trade unions.""2 Therefore, it appears that con-
federations and the union federation representing the majority of the
employees will not be consulted regarding legislative drafts concerning
labor and social security laws, but are only allowed to offer proposed
amendments to the existing laws, as well as new legislation. Conse-
quently, the 1991 Law significantly limits a union's opportunity to pub-
licly state its views on key government issues and decisions.
The new changes may be an effort to curb the small local union's
or plant trade union's political role since their main function is "to en-
216 A plant trade union's main function is "to engage in collective bargaining and conclude
the related agreements." 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 21.
237 See supra note 66 and related text.
2 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 19.3.
219 d art. 19.4.
n Id. art. 20.1.
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gage in collective bargaining and conclude the related agreements .... "
and "[i]n the labor sectors not covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments, consulting the trade unions is a prerequisite for regulating work-
ing conditions and wages."' Therefore, unions have a legal right to
engage in collective bargaining, and employers were required to consult
with unions regarding wages and working conditions even if they were
not a party to a collective bargaining agreement.
Under the 1991 Law, the scope of the plant trade union activities
include:'
1. Taking a position on individual employee affairs to the extent
regulated in the provisions of the Labor Law.
2. Taking a position vis-a-vis the employer and the workers' self-
government body at the work place on matters concerning the collec-
tive rights and interests of employees.
3. Monitoring the adherence to labor law provisions at the work
place, and in particular the adherence to the provisions and principles
of hygiene and safety of labor.
4. Directing the activities of the social inspectorate of labor and
cooperating with the state inspectorate of labor.
5. Attending to the living conditions of pensioners and annuitants.
This new provision simply recodifies the 1982 Act.'
Like the 1982 Act, the 1991 Law continues to restrict the scope
and content of collective agreements by defining the subjects of collec-
tive bargaining as: remuneration; the rules for granting awards and bo-
nuses; the determination of work rules; work timetable and vacation
timetable; the determination of the guidelines for the use of welfare and
housing funds; and the distribution of those benefits.' 4 Under the
1982 Act, the collective bargaining subjects included the utilization and
distribution of the social and housing funds, remuneration including the
award of prizes and bonuses, working regulations, work time distribu-
tion, and vacation plans.' 2
Both the 1991 Law and the 1982 Act indicate that the rights of
trade unions relating to the formation of plant remuneration systems are
defined by separate regulations.' Therefore, the national government
still plays an active role in regulating wages and implicitly maintains a
• Id. art. 21.
22 I art. 26.
" 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 35.
z 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 27.
= 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 36.
"2 Id. ch. IV, art. 36.3; 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 27.3.
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role in regulating working conditions, since most Polish employers are
still state-controlled. Consequently, genuine collective bargaining is dif-
ficult to imagine and free interplay of economic forces in the labor
market remains stifled. 7
C. The 1991 Law on Collective Disputes Compared to the 1982 Act
The 1991 Law requires that disputes between unions and employers
must be resolved under the 1991 Law on Resolving Collective Bargain-
ing Disputes (hereinafter, 1991 Law on Disputes)." This requirement
parallels the 1982 Act regarding resolution of a collective dispute.2 9
Poland's 1991 Law on Disputes works in conjunction with, and
supplements, the 1991 Law on Trade Unions." Poland's 1991 Law on
Disputes limits the subject of "collective disputes" to wages, working
conditions, social benefits, union rights and freedoms of employees.Y
Furthermore, collective disputes can only arise between employer(s) and
employees who are entitled to organize or join a trade union as defined
in article 2, chapter 1 of the 1991 Law. 2 The government cannot be-
come a party to a collective dispute; only employers can.23 This app-
ears anomalous since the government is the owner of most employer
entities.
Under the new legislation, local union branches are not allowed to
enter into collective disputes with the government, but must request
national union authorities to act as their agent in such negotiations.'
Under the 1982 Act, the subject of a collective dispute was not defined,
and therefore it was arguable that political issues affecting the employer-
employee relationship were proper subjects of a collective dispute, which
the local union could pursue."a
Poland's 1991 Law on Disputes indicates that '"[i]n a place of
As of August 31, 1991, only 8.8% of the 8,443 state enterprises had been transformed
into limited liability companies or liquidated. Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, § 3.2.1.
22 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 37. "Disputes between trade unions and employers and
their organizations regarding worker interest are resolved under the guidelines defined by a sepa-
rate law." Id. See 0 Rozwiazywaniu Spor6w Zbiorowych [Law on Resolving Collective Bargain-
ing Disputes], 91EP0609A ch. 1, art. 1 (Pol.) [hereinafter 1991 Law on Disputes].
See 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 40.
1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 37.
" See 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 1 (stating that "[e]mployees' collective
disputes with an employer or employers can concern working conditions, wages, or social bene-
fits and union rights and freedoms of employees or other groups, who are entitled to the right to
organize themselves into trade unions).
232 id.
13 Gazeta Wyboreza, Government versus Miners, POLISH NEWS BULL., Nov. 13, 1991, at 1.
2 id.
" 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 40.
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work, in which more than one union organization is active, any of them
can represent the employees' interests, which are the subject of the...
collective dispute... " or the unions can decide to provide a joint
representation of the employee(s) in the collective dispute. 6 Also, "in
a place of work, in which no trade union is active, a union organization
that the employees ask to represent their collective interests can conduct
a collective dispute in the name of the employees." 7 There were no
parallel provisions in the 1982 Act regarding multiple unions at one
plant or employer, nor did provisions exist addressing employees in a
non-union facility.23 Only one union was allowed to exist at an em-
ployer until 1985."ss
The assertion of a collective dispute is prohibited if "settlement is
possible through proceedings before a body for settling disputes involv-
ing employees' claims."2' Therefore, the resolution of the dispute is
relegated to a negotiation-conciliation-arbitration procedure substantially
similar to the procedures developed in the 1982 Act.24' Additionally,
like the 1982 Act, a union's most potent economic weapon, the strike, is
an option only after complying with the statutory dispute resolution
provisions.2
Moreover, the "initiation of a dispute to change the contract or
agreement can occur no sooner than the date of termination, which is
usually subject to three months notice."'243 Therefore, when a contract
is in force, disputes which arise during contract negotiations cannot
qualify as a "collective dispute," and therefore are not subject to the
provisions contained in the 1991 Law on Disputes.2" Again, there
were no provisions addressing these issues in the 1982 Act, and this
indicates at best a clarification of the prior law, or at worst, a new re-
striction imposed on the unions' right to strike resulting from the limit-
ing definition of a "collective dispute."'245
"' 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 3.1-3.2. See also supra notes 162-63 and re-
lated text.
1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 3.4.
' See generally 1982 Act, supra note 65, ch. V.
239 See supra note 45 and related text.
u 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 4.
41 Id. chs. 2-4. See also 1982 Act, supra note 65, ch. V.
24 See generally 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228.
" Id. art. 4.2.
I" d. This is similar to many American collective bargaining agreements which prevent a
union from striking during the term of the agreement through a no-strike clause. ROBERT A.
GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW - UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 604-5
(1976). If a union strikes and the contract has a no-strike clause, the employer can go to court
and obtain an injunction to enjoin the strike activity. Id. at 607-08.
24 1982 Act, supra note 65, ch. V. In the United States, under section 7 of the National
1993]
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Under the 1991 Law on Disputes a "collective dispute exists on the date
it is announced by the unit representing the employees' interests to the
employer with demands regarding ... [wages, working conditions, so-
cial benefits, union rights and/or freedoms of employees]21 . . . if the
employer does not meet all of the demands by the deadline set out in
the announcement, no less than three days."'247 The 1991 Law on Dis-
putes further states that, "[i]n the announcement of the dispute, the sub-ject of the demands included in the dispute is to be defined. The unit
announcing the dispute can warn that if the demands raised are not met,
a strike will be announced. The day of the announced strike cannot
come before the passage of 14 days from the date of the announcement
of the dispute."2'
Thus, the collective conflict begins on the day when a trade union
organization notifies the employer about its demands.'ss The latter has
three days to satisfy all postulates, while at the same time the trade un-
ion may put the employer on notice that a strike action will follow the
failure to heed the demands.ao The strike action itself is technically
allowed to commence within fourteen days from the announcement of a
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), employees have the right to engage in concerted activity, includ-
ing the right to strike to exert economic pressure, on the employer to yield to their demands.
GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 143, at 138. Under section 8 of the NLRA, the employer
cannot discipline employees for using economic pressure. lId Howeier, the employer is not re-
quired to yield to his employees' demands and may defend his own economic interests. d at
138-39. The employer does not have to pay employees when they are striking, and can lock out
employees and/or unilaterally subcontract their work. Id. at 139. In addition, the employer can
hire permanent replacements for economic strikers, but not unfair labor-practice-strikers, in an
effort to continue his business, but not to punish the striking employees. Id Regardless, the
employer has a continuing duty to bargain during a strike, and thus is obliged to respond to
union demands. Id. at 142. However, if a collective bargaining agreement exists between the
union and employer, section 8(d) of the NLRA requires the party seeking to terminate or modify
the agreement to give the other party 60 days notice prior to the contract's expiration date.
GORMAN, supra note 244, at 424. Under section 8(d), the union is required to "meet and confer"
with the employer, and a strike is prohibited for the 60 days following the termination or modi-
fication notice, or until the contract expires, whichever occurs later. Id. "The purpose of this
prohibition . . . is to give the parties a period . . . to reach a settlement through peaceful nego-
tiations and not by economic force." Id. If no settlement is reached within 30 days after the
initial notification, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service should be notified and given
an opportunity to aid in a peaceful solution. Id. at 425. If workers engage in a premature strike
during this period, they can be summarily discharged and/or the union may lose its status as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the unit. Id at 426.
2 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 1.
2" Id. art. 7.1.
20 Id art. 7.2.
29 The Right to Strike in the New Trade Union Law, SoLIDARNOSC NEWS, Sept. 1991, at 1
(Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidamosc, Brussels, BeIg.).
2WId.
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"collective dispute"; however, it is unlikely that the parties would be
able to move through the negotiation and mediation procedures, which
are pre-conditions to a legal strike set out later in the legislation, within
fourteen days."5
Procedurally, after the union announces a collective dispute, the
employer is obligated to commence negotiations without delay 2 "for
the purpose of settling the dispute through agreement and simultaneously
reports the occurrence of the dispute to the appropriate district labor
inspector. 3 Negotiations should be crowned with a signed agreement,
and in case of a stalemate, with a statement ... [describing] the posi-
tions of the parties."'  Chapter 2 of the 1991 Law on Disputes ex-
panded upon a provision in the earlier legislation by more specifically
delineating the requirements and parameters of the negotiation phase of
resolving a collective dispute."
Under the 1982 Act, when a collective dispute arose, "the relevant
trade union bodies and the administration bodies" were required to "im-
mediately begin negotiations with a view to settling the dispute."
256
Under the current law, if the negotiations fail to resolve the dispute and
the union continues to press for its demands, "the dispute is conducted
with the participation of a... mediator." Both sides jointly select
the mediator, who can be picked from a list suggested by the Minister
of Labour and Social Policy (hereinafter Minister).25 The selection
process must be made within a five-day period, but if it fails, the medi-
ator will be a person suggested by one of the sides and accepted by the
Minister.29 Negotiations conducted in the presence of the mediator
may be prolonged if additional procedures turn out to be necessary (i.e.
specifying further conditions related to the conflict, or preparing an as-
sessment of the financial status of the enterprise).2" The allocation of
the costs of employing an expert-consultant for such procedures is de-
cided by both sides or, if there is no agreement, they are borne by the
251 J
25n Id.
2 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 8.
25 Id. art 9.
Id. ch. 2.
1982 Act, supra note 65, ch. V, art. 40.
1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 10.
25 Id. art. 11.1. The Minister of Labour and Social Policy is responsible for employment
policy, the efficient use of human resources, work organization and conditions, pay rate and
benefits, social security and social security benefits. Doing Business in Poland, supra note 1, §
2.4.
2w 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 11.2.
' The Right to Strike in the New Trade Union Law, supra note 249, at 1.
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employer.26" ' When negotiations prove successful, an agreement is
signed; otherwise a statement of the differences is to be drafted.262
Under the 1991 Law on Disputes, which is similar to the
1982 Act,263 if mediation "will not lead to the resolution of the dis-
pute" within 14 days from the announcement of the dispute, which may
be extended upon the union's consent where the mediator requires ad-
ditional information or analyses, the union "can organize a single war-
ning strike of no more than two hours."2'4 Moreover, "[t]he failure to
reach an agreement resolving the collective dispute in mediation pro-
ceedings confers the right to initiate a strike.' '26'
According to the 1991 Law on Disputes, a "strike" is "a collective
stoppage by the employees in the performance of their work for the
purposes of resolving a dispute ....6 The 1982 Act defined a
"strike" as "a voluntary, collective stopping of work by employees un-
dertaken in order to defend the economic and social interests of the
given group of employees." 7 The current law declares that, "[a] strike
is a final means and cannot be announced without previously exhausting
the possibilities for resolving a dispute . . ." through negotiations or
mediation unless "illegal action of the employer prevents the conduct of
talks or mediation . . . " or "[i]f the employer dissolves the employment
relation with the union activists conducting the dispute."
Like the 1982 Act, the 1991 Law on Disputes requires exhaustion
of the legally-imposed dispute resolution mechanisms before a union can
initiate a strike.269 However, the new code creates an exception by al-
lowing a strike without adhering to the procedural steps where the em-
ployer resorts to illegally hindering negotiations or mediation (e.g. by
refusing to participate in negotiations as prescribed by law27° or by fir-
ing a trade union member who is active in the conflict)."
This provision discourages employers from engaging in bad-faith dilatory
tactics and discriminating against employees for exercising rights granted
21 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 18.
u Id. art. 14.
.. 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 49. Article 49 states: "A strike may be preceded by a war-
ning strike. The duration of a warning strike should be limited to the indispensable minimum
and may not exceed two hours." Id. These short warning strikes and declarations of strike readi-
ness eliminated the need for complete work stoppages. Szubert, supra note 1, at 67.
4 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 12.
25 Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 17.1.
1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 44.1.
u' 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 17.2.
The Right to Strike in the New Trade Union Law, supra note 249, at 2.
Id. See also 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 17.2.
=" 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 17.2.
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under the national labor laws.
Under the current legislation, before a union can declare a strike, it
must obtain an "agreement of a majority of the employees voting if at
least 50% of the employees . . . participate in the voting." '272 If the
strike involves several enterprises, the same requirement applies to each
enterprise. 3 The new law requires the union to "take into consider-
ation the relation of the demands to the losses associated with the
strike" when making a decision to announce a strike. 4
If a majority of the union members vote to strike, an employee can
then voluntarily choose whether or not to participate in a strike.
The law makes clear that participation in a strike action is entirely vol-
untary, and neither a trade union organization nor any individual has the
right to force workers to participate or to harass those refusing to take
part.76 These provisions simply refined and recodified similar provi-
sions of the 1982 Act.' In addition, under the new statute, "[t]he an-
nouncement of a strike [by a statutory trade union] should occur at least
five days before it begins."278 This evidences a minor change since un-
der the previous law it was recommended that seven days notice be giv-
en before commencing a strike.279
The 1991 Law on Disputes includes several provisions which at-
tempt to insure that Polish citizens are safe and secure. For example,
"stopping work as part of a strike is not permitted at tasks, equipment,
and installations where stopping work threatens human life and health or
state security."'
n2 Id. art. 20.2.
27 The Right to Strike in the New Trade Union Law, supra note 249, at 2.
' 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 17.3. See also 1982 Act, supra note 65,
art. 44.3.
2" 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 23.
76 The Right to Strike in the New Trade Union Law, supra note 249, at 2.
r See 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 45.1, 45.3, 44.3.
z 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 20.3.
1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 45.4.
1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 19.1. "The organization of strikes is not per-
mitted at the Office of State Protection, in units of police, or the armed forces of the Republic
of Poland, in prison services, in the border guard, and in organizational units of the fire protec-
tion service." Id. art. 19.2. Furthermore, "[t]he right to strike is not available to employees in
bodies of the state authorities, of the government administration and the self-governments, of the
courts, or in the prosecutorial offices." Id. art. 19.3. These limitations prohibiting employees in
certain jobs from engaging in a strike are not as broad as the restrictions under the 1982 Act.
See 1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 47 (prohibiting employees in the following industries from
striking: the arms industry; state administration; banks; military units; the supply of water, elec-
tricity, gas and food; health services; employees of courts and prosecutors' offices; employees
subject to the Ministers of Defense and Home Affairs; employees in plants located in regions
which were proclaimed disaster areas; and to some extent, employees in transportation and mass
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However, for employees who do not have the right to strike, the
1991 Law on Disputes allows a union in another enterprise to "organize
a Solidarity strike no longer than half the working day" on a voluntary
basis, while maintaining all the rights of the trade union's members.8 1
Furthermore, the current code provides that, "[t]he participation of an
employee in a strike organized in accord with the provisions of the law
does not constitute a violation of the employee duties.""2 During a
legal strike,
283
[a]n employee retains the right to benefits from social insurance and
the rights deriving from his relation of work with the exception to the
right to wages. The period of stoppage and the performance of the
work is included in the period of employment at the place of work
[for seniority purposes].
These provisions again basically recodify almost identical provisions of
the 1982 Act.2
Thus, under the current law, unions are required to engage in nego-
tiations and mediation, and attempt to resolve the dispute, to perfect the
legal right to strike. Ultimately, the union has the right to strike within
14 days of the announcement of a dispute if: (1) there is no collective
bargaining agreement in force so that a "collective dispute" can be le-
gally recognized; (2) the union does not consent to extend this time
period should the mediator require additional studies or analyses to aid
him/her in mediating the dispute; (3) the negotiation and mediation pro-
cedures are legally concluded without resolving the dispute; and (4) a
majority of the employees vote to strike.
If the union does not exercise its right to strike, it can "make an
attempt to resolve the dispute by submitting it for resolution to a coun-
media). Moreover, "[s]trike action does not reduce the management's rights pertaining to workers
not taking part, as well as to ensuring security within the enterprise. The director retains full
power to supervise those premises and installations whose continuous operation is essential for
the normal functioning of the enterprise after the strike, or whose operation may constitute a
danger to health or life. For the above purposes, strike organizers are obligated to cooperate with
the management." The Right to Strike in the New Trade Union Law, supra note 249, at 2. See
also 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 21.
"' 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 22.
SId. art. 23.1.
Id. art. 23.2
See 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 51, 52 (stating that "participation in a strike organised
in accordance with the above provisions does not constitute a violation of the employees' duties
and responsibilities, and cannot involve adverse consequences for the participants"). During a
legal strike, "employees preserve the right to social security allowances and other benefits due
under the contract of employment, except the right to pay." Id.
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cil for public arbitration."' The council for public arbitration under
the regional voivodship court settles disputes involving individual enter-
prises, while the council for public arbitration settles disputes between
trade unions and more than one individual company or plant.286 The c-
ouncil for public arbitration consists of the chairman "and six members,
of which each party to the dispute names three." '87 "The decision of
the council is made by a majority vote . . . " and ". . . is binding
upon the parties," unless either party, prior to the submission of the
dispute to the council, decides otherwise. 8
The 1991 Law on Disputes retains most of its predecessor's restric-
tions regarding the right to strike, except that under the earlier law,
undergoing public arbitration was a necessary pre-condition to strike. 9
A further pre-condition to strike under the prior law was a statement by
the union, prior to arbitration, that it would not be bound by the arbitra-
tion settlement. Without such a reservation, the arbitration settlement
was binding for both parties and a strike was precluded."9
However, this reservation is not needed for a union to procure the
right to strike under the 1991 Law on Disputes; arbitration is an alter-
native rather than a pre-condition to declaring a strike should the negoti-
ation and/or mediation procedures fail to resolve the collective dispute.
However, the possibility exists that the union would forego its right to
strike and submit to public arbitration and state that it would not be
bound by the arbitration settlement. If the union is not satisfied with the
arbitration settlement in this situation, it is unclear what will occur next.
In this event, a collective dispute could possibly remain unresolved be-
cause the union has foregone its right to strike and is not bound by the
arbitration settlement.
There are alternatives to arbitration or striking. For example, after
the union exhausts the negotiation proceedings and fails to reach an
agreement resolving the collective dispute, it may engage in other forms
of legal "protest action" to protect workers' rights and interests. 9
Significantly, the right to protest is also enjoyed by workers who do not
have the right to strike. 2  It is also a newly-granted right since there
is no similar provision under the 1982 Act allowing the employees to
28 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 16.1.
Id. art. 16.2.
Id. arts. 16.2-16.3.
n Id. art. 16.6.
1982 Act, supra note 65, art. 42. See also INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22,
ch. XIV, § 2.
o INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, ch. XIV, § 2.
2 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 25.1.
29 The Right to Strike in the New Trade Union Law, supra note 249, at 2.
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engage in social or other forms of protest besides a strike before com-
pletely exhausting the negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration proce-
dures. 293
According to the 1991 Law on Disputes, anyone who "[h]ampers
the initiation or the conduct of a collective dispute in accord with the
law," or "[d]oes not perform his duties as defined in this law, is subject
to being punished by a fine." 294 Furthermore, "[w]hoever directs a
strike or other protest action organized in violation of the provisions of
this law is subject to. . ." a fine. 5 Finally, "[t]he organizer bears the
responsibility for damages caused by a strike or protest or action orga-
nized in violation of the provisions of. . ." this law. 6 These provisio-
ns recodified analogous provisions in the 1982 Act. 7 However, the
1991 Law on Disputes discards a 1982 Act provision imposing penal
sanctions upon a violator. 8
The 1991 Polish labor legislation better defines a union, its pur-
pose, and who can become members. Nevertheless, it remains unclear
whether farmers fall within the term "members of agriculture producer
cooperatives," and thus whether they can become union members.
The 1991 Law expressly allows unions to own property, but restricts a
right previously granted to plant trade unions regarding consultation on
legislation, thereby limiting a local union's opportunity to voice its con-
cerns. Under the 1991 Law on Disputes, political issues affecting the
employer-employee relationship are not deemed proper subjects for a
collective dispute. Moreover, the 1991 Law on Disputes clarified the
requirements of the union during the negotiation phase; however, the
union was given the option to strike without having to first submit to
public arbitration. In addition, unions are allowed to strike where the
employer illegally hinders the collective dispute resolution process or
terminates a union member for being active in the conflict. Finally, the
1991 Law on Disputes provides workers which do not have a right to
strike, a right to protest.
After comparing and contrasting the 1982 Act with the
1991 legislation, against the backdrop of the workers' and unions' de-
mands and the commentators' and scholars' criticisms, the current legis-
lation should be analyzed to determine whether it complies with interna-
tional labor standards and regulations, since "Poland is a member of the
293 See generally 1982 Act, supra note 65.
9 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 26.1.
2" Id. art. 26.2.
Id. art. 26.3.
r 1982 Act, supra note 65, arts. 53-54.
1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 26.2.
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international labor community."
V. DoEs POLAND'S 1991 LAW SATISFY THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS
REGARDING LABOR RELATIONS?
The United Nations International Labour Organization (hereinafter
ILO) was established in 1919 to promote social justice."o The Interna-
tional Labour Conference adopts conventions and recommendations by a
majority of two-thirds of the delegates." ' Conventions are meant to
create international obligations for the states which ratify them, while
recommendations do not give rise to obligations, but provide guidelines
for government actions." Conventions are binding only upon member
states that have registered their ratifications with the Director General of
the International Labour Office. 3 The ILO sets minimum standards in
such fields as wages, social security, hours of work, and conditions of
employment.3"t ILO conventions and recommendations have the force
of international law, and are binding upon the countries which ratify
them."5
Although the ILO has no enforcement power, its condemnations
carry a sting most nations seek to avoid.' In 1984, the ILO found
that the Polish government had infringed upon workers' rights by sup-
pressing Solidarity under martial law in December of 1981."0 The ILO
report indicated that Poland had breached two labor conventions regard-
ing the freedom of association (Convention 87) and the right of workers
to organize and conduct collective bargaining (Convention 98).30' Po-
'9 Swiatkowski, supra note 12, at 47.
'1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, Codex.
301 Id.
fld.
Id
ILO Notes Report on Poland in Face of Warsaw Threat to Quit, Reuters North European
Service, Nov. 16, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File [hereinafter ILO Notes
Report].
SId.
Harry Bernstein, ILO Agreement Will End 34 Years of American Inaction, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1987, at 3.
' Tony Barber, Warsaw, Poland - International News, Reuters North European Service,
Nov. 19, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, Codex. Convention 87 provides, in perti-
nent part:
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right
to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned,
to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.
Workers' and employers' organizations shall have the right to draw up their
constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to orga-
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land, a founding member of the seventy year-old ILO, was condemned
for its brutal suppression of Solidarity." 9 A three-man ILO commission
concluded that the 1982 Act in Poland and the officially-approved trade
unions set up in place of Solidarity were an "invention of the govern-
ment."31 The commission found that the new unions did not represent
the views of the Polish workers, and confirmed that there had been no
freedom of choice or association in Poland.3
The pre-Solidarity government of Poland had ratified the key ILO
conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining.
312
In fact, Solidarity invoked the principles contained in these conventions
to secure its initial recognition.313 Despite the fact that some of the
ILO's comments were addressed by the 1982 Act, fundamental provi-
sions of that law did not conform to the principles of freedom of associ-
ation and collective bargaining.3"4 Therefore, trade unions were not au-
thentic representatives to defend the working people's rights and inter-
ests because they were not guaranteed the full freedom relating to their
foundation and activities.3"5 Because of the U.N. agency's criticism re-
garding the ban of the Solidarity trade union, Poland formally withdrew
nize their administration and activities, and to formulate their programs.
The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would re-
strict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.
Convention 98 provides, in pertinent part, that:
Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimina-
tion in respect to their employment. Governments shall not 'make the em-
ployment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a union
or relinquish trade union membership;' or 'cause the dismissal of or other-
wise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership . . . . Workers'
and employers' organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts
of interference ...in their establishment, functioning or administration ...
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary,
to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of machinery
for voluntary negotiation between employers and employers' organizations
and workers' organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and con-
ditions of employment by means of collective agreements . . . . This con-
vention does not deal with the position of public servants engaged in the
administration of the state, nor shall it be construed as prejudicing their
rights or status in any way.
Il
30 ILO Notes Report, supra note 304.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, A Window in Poland, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1983, at A19.
313 id.
314 Labour Body Considers Complaints, Plans '84 Conference, U.N. CHRON., Jan. 1983, at
117.
31" Kawadzki, supra note 31.
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from the ILO on November 19, 1984.316
Poland's new labor laws apparently address these criticisms by
stating that "[a] trade union is a voluntary and self-governing organiza-
tion of laboring people," and gives "[t]he right to establish and join
trade unions" to all employees.317 In addition, the new labor legislation
penalizes anyone who "(1) hinders the lawful establishment of a trade
union organization, (2) complicates the exercise of trade union activities
conducted pursuant to the present law," or "(3) discriminates against any
employees by reason of their belonging or not belonging to a trade
union, or by reason of their performance of trade union duties."3 "8
Thus, the requirements of Convention 87 regarding the freedom of un-
ions and the protection of their rights appear to be amply satisfied by
the 1991 legislation.
The new statutes expressly give all employees the right to establish
and join trade unions, and specifically state that "[n]o one may suffer
negative consequences for belonging or not belonging to a trade union
or for holding a trade union office." 319 "[Tirade unions have the right
to engage in collective bargaining and conclude the related agree-
ments. '' 310 Thus, these provisions appear to fulfill the requirements of
Convention 98 regarding the principles of freedom of association and
collective bargaining.
However, the LO concluded in 1990 that the refusal to register
collective agreements negotiated at the national or industry level if they
diverged from the state social and economic policies was "incompatible
with 1LO Convention 98 on the right to organize and collective bargain-
ing.' a  But the 1991 Law addresses this condemnation by only requir-
ing unions, federations, and confederations to register, which is refused
oily if its by-laws are inconsistent with the provisions of the present
law.31 Under the new labor code, unions are granted "the right to en-
gage in collective bargaining and conclude the related agreements" with-
out being required to register those agreements, nor are the agreements
required to comport with the state's social and economic policies.
Thus, these new provisions apparently address the LO's recent
criticisms and are compatible with 1LO Convention 98 regarding the
right to organize and engage in collective bargaining. Therefore, the
316 Barber, supra note 307.
"' 1991 Law, supra note 141, arts. 1.1, 2.1.
3,8 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 35.1.
319 Id arts. 2.1, 3.
o 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 21.1.
COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 38, at 1241.
31 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 14.2
3 Id. art. 21.1.
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1991 Law on Trade Unions appears to fully comply with the ILO's
conventions.
In addition to being a member of the ILO, Poland is also seeking
to become a member of the European Community, another international
organization. The EC has entered into an agreement-with the ILO for
"the exchange of information and for technical assistance. '' 3U There-
fore, Poland's 1991 labor code should be analyzed to determine if it
satisfies the EC's guidelines.
VI. DOES THE 1991 POLISH LABOR LEGISLATION COMPLY WITH THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S SOCIAL CHARTER REQUIREMENTS?
On December 16, 1991, Poland signed an association agreement
with the European Community (hereinafter EC) and formally received
associate member status which took effect on March 1, 1992."z The
EC is an international organization
•.. of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own person-
ality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the inter-
national plane and, more particularly, real power stemming from a
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the
community, the Member States to the Community have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and have thus created a
body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.3'
The EC "is designed to bring about the general integration of the
Member States' economies .... .327 Individual Member States transfer
some national sovereignty and decision making to the EC, thereby al-
lowing the EC to promulgate an "organized and structured system of
legal rules, with its own sources, and its own institutions and procedures
324 DOMINIK LAsOK & J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIEs 37 (1973).
3 EC Association Agreement Signed, WARSAW VOICE, Dec. 22, 1991, at 5. An associate
membership is a preliminary stage intended to lead to full membership within the community.
LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 324, at 36. "The purpose of an association agreement is to create
a customed union as between community members and the associated state with, in some instan-
ces, the provision of financial loans to the associated state and in others the extension of com-
munity benefits ... " Id
326 JEAN-VICTOR Louis, THE COMMUNrTY LEGAL ORDER 9 (1990). The EC is actually three
communities, each established by a separate treaty. Id. at 7. These three communities share the
same member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Id. The EC was formed on July 1, 1967 when the
executive organs of the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), the European Economic
Community ("EEC"), and the European Atomic Energy Community ("EURATOM") were merged
into a single council under a treaty signed in Brussels on April 8, 1965. Id.
3' Id. at 7.
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for making, interpreting and enforcing those rules. ''31s Consequently,
the EC's legal system becomes an integral part of the Member States'
legal systems which their courts are bound to apply.329
Prior to 1988, eastern European countries were subjected to "the
least favorable trade policy among third countries;" however, since 1989
the EC has provided Poland with aid and loans to assist with its
economy's restructuring.33° Moreover, since Poland has become an as-
sociate member, it has gained, and will continue to gain, even more
privileged access to EC markets.331 Such concessions demonstrate the
depth of the EC's desire to integrate Poland into the EC's trading sys-
tem.3
32
Like many eastern European countries that are now considering full
membership of the EC as a long-term goal, Poland seeks to enter into a
full association agreement to enjoy the full benefits of the EC through
binding international treaties.333 While Poland seeks to negotiate for a
full EC membership,33  it should contemplate the probability of even-
tually attaining full EC membership, and since Poland has to replace the
statutes of the socialist legal tradition with laws facilitating the recon-
struction of the market system,335 it should be mindful of the
EC directives and guidelines as it determines the contours of its present
and future laws.
For example, the EC's Community Charter of the Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers (hereinafter Social Charter)336 was adopted
SId at 11 (internal citation omitted).
9 Id
' The EC realized that the eastern European countries could not restructure their political
and economic systems without the EC's backing. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrTY, THE SOVIET
UNION AND EASTmERN EUROPE, Introduction I (Kenneth R. Simmonds ed., 1991). Therefore, the
EC has begun to develop "trade, commercial and economic relationships." Id. It has also begun
to negotiate association agreements to create free trade with the formerly Socialist countries of
eastern Europe. Richard D. English, Company Law on the European Single Market, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1413, 1539-40 (1990). Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugo-
slavia are making strides to transform from socialist to free-market economies. Id The future of
such relationships "depends on the progress of these countries toward market economies, multi-
party systems, free and fair elections, respect for human rights, and the rule of law." Id. at
1540.
3' EC Initials Accords With Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Inter Press Service, Nov. 22,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
332 The Preamble to the accord "clearly states that the 'ultimate objective' of the agreement
is full EC membership. Id.
3 Trade Relations EC - Central and Eastern Europe, supra note 3, § 3.5.1.4.
3 Id.
Id. §§ 1.6, 3.2.2.
Commission of the European Communities, Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers (1990) reprinted in ANGELA BYRE, EC SOCIAL POLICY AND 1992, at 9-12 (1992) [here-
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on December 9, 1989, and was influenced by the ILO Conventions and
the Council of Europe's Social Charter.33 It is designed to guarantee
basic rights for all workers in the EC and is aimed at improving
workers' living and working conditions by cushioning the negative im-
pact of a single labor market without internal borders.338 Social prog-
ress or social rights, as the EC signatories have declared, must go hand-
in-hand with the corresponding economic progress.339 Although the So-
cial Charter is not legally binding, it imposes an obligation on the sig-
nataries to guarantee fundamental social rights contained in the Char-
ter.m
°
The Social Charter includes, inter alia, a provision for the right to
belong to a trade union, to negotiate and conclude collective agreements,
and to strike." l Its basic aim is to create a social framework of mini-
mum requirements, leaving the Member States to fill in the details as
they see fit. 2 The responsibility to implement the social rights lies
exclusively with the Member States within the limits of their powers, as
constituent parts of the communityY. Thus, EC Member States need
to insure the degree of industrial peace needed for the smooth operation
of their country's economy.'
On its surface, Poland's 1991 Law and 1991 Law on Disputes
appear to satisfy the Social Charter's requirements regarding freedom of
association and collective bargaining. All Polish employees have a statu-
tory right to establish and join trade unions." "Trade unions have the
right to engage in collective bargaining and conclude the related agree-
ments . . . ."' Furthermore, employees are given the right to strike
after first engaging in negotiation and mediation to resolve a collective
dispute.4 7 Although Poles literally have a legal right to strike, it may
not be a meaningful or practical right to strike as previously discussed.
While Poland's 1991 labor laws may comply with the letter of the So-
inafter, Social Charter].
'" BYRE, supra note 336, at 5.
33 Social Charter, supra note 336, Preamble.
3" Coopers & Lybrand, Euroscope Excise Duties and Other Indirect Taxes, Social Affairs
(Aug. 29, 1991 through Sept. 5, 1991) available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Euroscope File.
30 Id.
" Social Charter, supra note 336, paras. 11-13.
3 Id. Preamble. See also GEORGE A. BERMANN, Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EuRO-
PEAN COMMUNrrY LAw 1152 (1992).
3 Social Charter, supra note 336, paras. 27-30.
3" Morris Weisz, A View of Labor Ministries in Other Nations, 3 BUREAU OF LABOR STATI-
STICS - MONTHLY LABOR REvIEw 19, 19 (July 1988).
3" 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 2.1.
34 Id. art. 21.1.
3" 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, chs. 2-3.
[Vol. 25:571
POLAND'S 1991 LABOR STATUTES
cial Charter, in practice, they may not comply with its spirit.
VII. CONCLUSION
Poland's new labor laws recodify and clarify their predecessor and
grant unions slight liberalizations in some aspects, while restricting
unions' powers in others. Although Poland's new laws literally comply
with the ILO Conventions and the EC Social Charter requirements, in
practice the right to strike remains highly restricted. The new legislation
continues to encourage effective problem-solving through negotiation and
mediation between unions and employers, while allowing unions to en-
gage in "other forms of protest action."'" The 1991 Law gives all em-
ployees the right to strike, except those in the armed services," but
prohibits a collective dispute from being proclaimed until a collective
agreement is properly terminated, which is usually subject to three
months notice."' Such a limited definition of a "collective dispute" is
more intrusive on a union's power than a no-strike clause in an Ameri-
can labor contract because it is government, rather than party, im-
posed."'
Plant trade unions are limited in their ability to negotiate with em-
ployers; plant contract terms may have to comport with collective agree-
ments negotiated at the national or industry level, and if more than one
plant trade union exists at an employer's location, they are required to
reach a common position on "matters requiring the conclusion of an
agreement or the coordination of the position taken" before negotiating
with the employer. 52 Again, the government imposes a legal obligation
upon the unions to reach a common position, which is distinguishable
from an American union's voluntary action to pursue a common demand
and engage in multi-employer bargaining.
Like American labor law, the 1991 Law limits collective bargaining
to the mandatory subjects of wages, work rules, work and vacation
schedules, and welfare and housing fund benefits.3" However, since
most Polish employers are still state-owned and controlled, the national
government still plays an active role in both negotiating and regulating
wages and working conditions.3
' Id art. 25.1. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
' 1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 19.1. See supra note 181 and related text.
1991 Law on Disputes, supra note 228, art. 4.2. See supra note 242 and accompanying
text
35 However, in America, section 8(d)(3) of the NLRA contains restrictions on a union's right
to strike. See supra note 245.
35 1991 Law, supra note 141, art. 30.3.
" Id. art. 27.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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As the Polish economy makes its transformation toward a market
system, and as the privatization of enterprises continues, the stage will
be set to allow the free interplay of economic forces to promote authen-
tic collective bargaining between autonomous employers and unions.
Thus, the state's need to intervene in collective bargaining as an agent
of the employer will lessen and the Polish law should again be amended
to move away from the FLRA framework and more closely approximate
the NLRA. This will facilitate the government's movement to a level of
minimal involvement in labor relations and to further promote the free
interplay of market forces, which is a touchstone to authentic negotia-
tions and agreements.
Poland's economic and political transformation has resulted in an
enormous decrease in real salaries and living standards for most Poles
and their patience seems to be running out.355 Since the summer of
1990, a series of strikes has broken out as the workers attempt to use
strikes as a weapon to improve living standards.356 In addition, there
have been several instances in late 1991 and early 1992 where unions
have threatened to strike to improve their living conditions,3 7 and
there are no reports yet of the government enforcing the new law re-
garding strikes and punishing the violators.358
These actions provide tangible evidence that Polish workers and/or
Id.
'Id.
Lodz's Textile Mills Continue Strike, POLISH NEWS BULL., Dec. 6, 1991 at 2. Workers at
two textile mills remained on strike to force the government to renegotiate a July agreement. Id.
Under the agreement, employees of endangered factories could request loans from welfare funds,
but the government ordered the loans stopped in October. Id. See also Linnett Myers, Solidarity
to Strike Against Price Hikes, Cl. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1992 at C23. Solidarity called a "nationwide
one-hour work stoppage Monday [January 14] to protest an order by the Solidarity-led govern-
ment to double the price of heating fuel, and to increase prices of natural gas 70 percent and
electricity 20 percent." Id.; Strikes Continue as Trade Unions Wait for Negotiations With Gov-
ernment (BBC radio broadcast, Jan. 16, 1992). On January 14, "Poland was hit by another wave
of strikes with about 50,000 workers in 14 aircraft factories staging a one-day stoppage demand-
ing government support for the industry." Id.; Anna Dubrawska, Education Crisis: Teachers Up
in Arms, WARSAW VOICE, Jan. 19, 1992 at 5. The teachers' union demands more money for
wages because their earnings dropped by 17 percent in 1991. Id. In October, 1991, the union
organized a silent march and held a one-hour nationwide strike on January 13, 1992. Id.; No
End to the Striking Spree, POLISH NEWS BULL., Jan. 22, 1992.
With the prices in the stores going through the roof and the national belt-
tightening measures reaching new heights, workers across the country are
either already on strike or plan to mount protests in the near future. Many
are desperately memoing [sic] authorities about their respective predicaments.
The beginning of the week marked still another period of a toughened union
stand in industry, transport, the health service, and education.
Id.
" No End to Striking Spree, supra note 357.
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unions continue to view the new strike procedures as too cumbersome,
and as restrictive as under the 1982 Act. Unless there is some evidence
of economic growth and an increase in living standards in the near fu-
ture, there may be further unrest in Poland and misuse of strikes.359
Moreover, the government's nonfeasance in the enforcement of this law
may result in a lack of respect for the law, as well as the further use of
strikes as political weapons.
The current restrictions regarding strikes deprive Polish laborers of
an effective strike weapon, and together with the current wage ceiling,
may stimulate illegal actions, thereby hampering Poland's ability to com-
plete its political and economic transformation, as well as undermining
its social and legal order.
Michael Albright
39 See supra note 344 and related text.
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve School of Law (1992).
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